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LAW, POLITICS, AND COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Daniel H. Cole* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the significant role cost–benefit analysis (CBA) 
plays in facilitating or impeding legislative and regulatory policy 
decisions. The Article centers around three case studies of CBAs the EPA 
prepared under three different presidents: (1) Clinton Administration 
changes to Clean Air Act air quality standards for ozone and particulate 
matter; (2) President Obama’s recent decision to suspend the EPA’s 
reconsideration of the Bush Administration’s air quality standard for 
ozone; and (3) the George W. Bush Administration’s “Clear Skies” 
legislative initiative. The first two case studies demonstrate, between them, 
how well-constructed CBAs can facilitate social-welfare-enhancing and 
impede welfare-reducing rules, even in cases where explicit consideration 
of costs is legally prohibited. The third case study tells a more complex 
story of how CBAs can be manipulated either to promote welfare-reducing 
regulations or impede welfare-enhancing regulations. When that happens, 
however, the virtuous transparency of CBAs renders those efforts liable to 
discovery and disclosure, as in the case of the Bush Administration’s failed 
“Clear Skies” initiative. The Article concludes with an assessment of the 
implications of the case studies for our understanding of the role of CBA in 
political (both legislative and regulatory) processes, and with a call for 
more qualitative and quantitative empirical research on the use and abuse 
of CBA as a political tool. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Governments at all levels have a legitimate, sometimes critical, role to 
play in resolving social-cost problems, including prevention of negative 
externalities, such as pollution and provision of public goods. Over time, 
governments and their agencies have developed various decision tools to 
assist those efforts. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is one such tool and is 
often incorporated into larger documents known as regulatory impact 
analyses (RIAs). 
Formal CBA has been around since the New Deal when President 
Roosevelt’s National Planning Board (established in 1934) began 
commissioning economic analyses of public works projects.1 Congress first 
required CBA in the Flood Control Act of 1936,2 § 1 of which provided 
that, “the Federal Government should improve or participate in the 
improvement of navigable waters . . . for flood-control purposes if the 
benefits . . . are in excess of the estimated costs . . . .”3 At that time, 
however, “the whole area of costs and benefits from flood control projects 
was poorly understood,”4 and no uniform set of principles and standards 
existed for measuring costs and benefits of government policies.5 In the 
1940s and 1950s, despite significant efforts to impose a uniform set of best 
practices for CBAs of water resources projects,6 individual agencies, 
 
1. Maynard M. Hufschmidt, Benefit–Cost Analysis: 1933–1985, 116 WATER RES. UPDATE 42, 42 
(2000). 
2. Id. 
3. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (1936). 
4. JOSEPH L. ARNOLD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE 1936 FLOOD CONTROL ACT 81 (1988). 
5. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 42. 
6. In May 1950, the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee—predecessor of the Inter-
Agency Committee on Water Resources (ICWR)—proposed the first set of federal “best practice” 
standards for CBA, with specific application to river basin projects. FED. INTER-AGENCY RIVER BASIN 
COMM., SUBCOMM. ON BENEFITS & COSTS, PROPOSED PRACTICES FOR ECON. ANALYSIS OF RIVER 
BASIN PROJECTS (1950). But the “Green Book,” as the document came to be known, was never 
formally adopted by participating agencies. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 43. The ICWR’s effort was 
closely followed, however, by the President’s Bureau of the Budget—predecessor of today’s Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)—which prepared its own set of CBA standards and practices, 
culminating in the 1952 publication of Budget Circular A-47. The Bureau’s document was more 
“conservative” than the 1950 “Green Book” in restricting the use of secondary benefits, requiring the 
use of the opportunity-cost approach to discounting future streams of costs and benefits, tied to the 
interest rate on long-term government bonds, and restricting to fifty years the time horizon for 
incorporating costs and benefits. Critics, including water resource agencies and proponents of water 
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including the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers, 
continued to take their own, often inconsistent, approaches to CBA.7 Only 
later, in the 1970s, did the use of CBA expand beyond water resources 
policy to encompass broader government programs, including pollution 
control.8 Since then, the discipline has continued to develop and mature.9 
In theory, CBA is supposed to be a neutral decision tool that helps 
government decision makers focus resources to maximize the social returns 
of public investments (or publicly mandated private investments) by (a) 
choosing social-cost problems worth resolving and (b) selecting 
mechanisms to resolve them.10 It is viewed as a kind of filter designed to 
capture welfare-reducing proposals, while allowing welfare-enhancing 
proposals to pass through.11 
In reality, CBA inevitably requires value judgments that are inherently 
subjective, rendering the analyses potentially manipulable for political 
ends. The most important subjective elements of CBAs include (a) 
valuations of reductions in human mortality12 and other non-market (e.g., 
environmental) goods and (b) the values used to determine the social 
discount rate.13 In the literature, one finds a large range of acceptable 
values for discount rates and non-market goods, including human lives, 
large enough to permit the strategic manipulation of outcomes that would 
either support or oppose efforts to resolve large-scale, social-cost 
 
resource projects in Congress, widely regarded Circular A-47 as a “severe restraint on water projects.” 
Id. Perhaps to counter that effect, the ICWR issued a new version of its “Green Book” in 1958. INTER-
AGENCY COMM. ON WATER RES., SUBCOMM. ON EVALUATION STANDARDS, PROPOSED PRACTICES FOR 
ECON. ANALYSIS OF RIVER BASIN PROJECTS (1958). This new edition of the “Green Book” did not 
differ greatly from the 1950 edition. Compared to Circular A-47, the 1958 “Green Book” supported 
longer time horizons, lower discount rates, and more extensive incorporation of secondary benefits, 
which served to justify more government action. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 44. Between Circular A-
47 and the 1958 “Green Book,” we see the beginnings of politically-motivated wrangling over CBA 
methodology, which continues to the present. 
7. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 43; see also Daniel H. Cole, Best Practice in Benefit–Cost 
Analysis, 23 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (2007) (noting that, “before the 1970s government agencies only 
rarely attempted to quantify the costs and benefits of their burgeoning regulatory programs, let alone 
predict costs and benefits prior to policy implementation”). 
8. Hufschmidt, supra note 1, at 43−44. 
9. Id. 
10. Cole, supra note 7, at 5. In practice, CBAs usually come into play only after a course of action 
already has been proposed. However, because non-action is always a policy option, every CBA 
inevitably involves an implicit or explicit determination of whether (de)regulatory action is warranted in 
the first place. 
11. Id. 
12. Often, cost–benefit analysts are accused of placing economic values on human lives. That is 
not quite accurate, although human life valuations can plausibly be derived from cost-estimates of 
measures designed to reduce mortality. See generally Trudy Ann Cameron, Euthanizing the Value of a 
Statistical Life, 4 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 161 (2010). 
13. Cole, supra note 7, at 3. 
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problems.14 Thus, CBAs are useful for both policy proponents and 
opponents. 
Sometimes, competing CBAs even become focal points for substantive 
policy disputes, as in the case of climate change, where economists have 
split into two camps based on whether their cost–benefit models focus on 
the mean expected damages of climate change or incorporate low-
probability, high-magnitude climate “catastrophes.”15 Those who focus on 
mean expected damages generally prefer a gradual ramping-up of 
greenhouse gas regulations.16 Others, who incorporate more high-harm 
scenarios into their climate models, generally prefer more rapid and 
stringent regulations.17 
The main purpose of this Article is not to assess whether CBAs more 
often impede or promote solutions to social-cost problems, but simply to 
describe and assess their influence in the context of specific cases and to 
explain how and why they are politically useful tools for interest groups 
and agencies even when those agencies are not required by law to prepare 
CBAs. For better or worse, CBAs have influenced policies for dealing with, 
or not dealing with, social-cost problems ranging from airport enlargement 
to water pollution standards and global climate change.18 
Part I of this Article describes, in relatively simple terms, the process of 
CBA. Part II consists of three case studies that examine the legitimate uses, 
as well as abuses, of CBAs by federal government agencies to either 
promote or impede regulatory policies. Those cases entail several important 
implications, including: (1) CBAs nearly always influence and can 
determine political outcomes, even when they are not supposed to do so 
under existing legal rules; (2) federal agencies, even when legally barred 
from considering cost, have incentives to produce and sometimes 
strategically manipulate CBAs to preempt or undermine political 
opposition to regulatory or deregulatory proposals; (3) because the 
assumptions of formal CBAs—including, for example, the valuation of 
 
14. See, e.g., Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant, Introduction to DISCOUNTING AND 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1, 4 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999). 
15. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The Challenge for 
Rational Risk Regulation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 412–13 (2000); Hal R. Varian, 
Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C3. See generally 
David Weisbach & Cass. R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433 (2009). 
16. See e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Climate Change: The Uncertainties, the Certainties, and What 
They Imply About Action, 4 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, no. 3, June 2007 at art. 3, 4, available at 
http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/EEP131/fall2007/ClimateChange/Climate%20Change%20The%20Unce
rtainties...%20(Schelling).pdf. 
17. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007). 
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC 
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2000); Robert Haveman, The Chicago O’Hare Expansion: A Case 
Study of Administrative Manipulation of Benefit–Cost Principles, 23 RES. L. & ECON. 183 (2007). 
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non-market goods such as human mortality and the social discount rate—
are generally required to be transparent, manipulation of CBAs for political 
ends is not always a successful strategy. 
I. THE CBA PROCESS: OBJECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF SUBJECTIVE 
CHOICE 
At its simplest, CBA can be described as a six-step process:19 
(1) specify the social-cost problem to be resolved—sometimes, but 
not always, exogenous to the CBA; 
(2) identify policy alternatives for doing so, including no action; 
(3) determine foreseeable impacts, including non-market impacts, 
of each of the alternatives over their expected life-spans as against 
some baseline; 
(4) assign values to those impacts: 
  (a) favorable impacts = benefits, 
  (b) unfavorable impacts = costs; 
(5) discount future costs and benefits to present-day dollars and 
calculate the net present benefits or costs for each alternative; 
(6) finally, compare the net benefits/costs or all alternatives and 
choose the alternative with the greatest net benefits or lowest net 
costs. 
The process appears straightforward enough, but appearances are 
deceiving. At virtually every step, subjective judgment calls are required,20 
which can bias the CBA either for or against proposed policies. In Step 1, 
the selection of the goal, or even the way the goal is framed, can influence 
the measurement of success or failure.21 Step 2, which involves the 
identification of policy alternatives, inevitably requires more or less 
arbitrary line-drawing, as the number of conceivable alternatives inevitably 
 
19. See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost–Benefit Analysis, 109 
YALE L.J. 165, 177−88 (1999). 
20. This assertion is not novel or even very controversial. See, e.g., E.J. MISHAN, COST–BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION 175–80, 322–24 (1971); ARTHUR SMITHIES, THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 344–45 (1955); Martin S. Feldstein, The Social Time Preference Discount Rate 
in Cost Benefit Analysis, 74 ECON. J. 360, 362 (1964); Christopher Nash, David Pearce & John Stanley, 
An Evaluation of Cost–Benefit Analysis Criteria, 22 SCOTT. J. POL. ECON. 121, 122 (1975); A.R. Priest 
& R. Turvey, Cost–Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683, 685 (1965). 
21. As observed in discussion supra note 10, policy goals typically are decided upon prior to the 
preparation of CBAs. However, because CBAs judge welfare effects against a business-as-usual/no-
action baseline, they can and do affect the threshold decision to act as well as the choice of mechanism 
for action. Cole, supra note 7, at 10. Thus, goal setting is not completely exogenous to the CBA 
process. Even if it were, goal setting inevitably would involve its own CBA, however (in)formal. Cole, 
supra note 7, at 10. 
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outstrips the capacity of any single CBA or broader decision-making 
process.22 Likewise, as every first-year law student learns in Torts class, the 
determination of foreseeable impacts requires the drawing of lines that 
cannot legitimately be tied to neutral principles or presumed consensus 
among all potentially interested parties.23 
Steps 4 and 5 in the CBA process provide more obvious and oft-
debated problems. In Step 4, values must be assigned to non-market goods, 
such as human lives, scenic vistas, and endangered plant species, without 
the usually reliable measure of money—this is sometimes referred to as a 
problem of “missing markets.”24 Despite unarguable improvements in 
alternative valuation techniques, including contingent valuation, hedonic 
pricing, travel-cost methods, etc., the range of “acceptable” valuations (as 
defined by editors and peer reviewers at academic journals) remains large, 
and the choice of any valuation within the “acceptable” range is 
contestable.25 Not only do analysts disagree about the values, they cannot 
even agree about the best way of measuring the values.26 In valuing various 
risks of death, is it best to measure statistical lives saved or lost, life years 
saved or lost, or quality-adjusted life years saved or lost? Are the lives of 
older statistical persons worth more or less than the lives of younger 
statistical persons? Are lives in some locales worth more than lives in 
others? If so, should valuations depend on per capita gross domestic 
product, wage levels, or living standards of the relevant country, county, or 
city?27 The fact that these issues persist should not be taken to mean that 
valuations of threats to human lives (among other non-market goods) are 
subject to such profound uncertainty as to disable CBA from eliciting 
useful information for policy decisions. However, no single CBA can be 
 
22. Cole, supra note 7, at 25–26. 
23. The classic case illustrating this point is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 
100–01 (N.Y. 1928). See also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 232 (1959) 
(observing that “in one sense everything is foreseeable, in another sense nothing”); DAVID G. OWEN ET 
AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14:4 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that “the innate 
vagueness of ‘foreseeability’” renders it a poor metric for determining the scope of liability). 
24. See generally Cole, supra note 7, at 25–26. 
25. Bounding the “acceptable” range seems more a matter of convention than an objective 
determination that higher and lower valuations cannot be correct. Portney & Weyant, supra note 14. 
26. Id. 
27. OMB Circular A-4 includes a useful discussion of different approaches to valuing human lives. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-4, at 31–37 (Sept. 
17, 2003), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter 
OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-4]. On the various issues raised by efforts to value human life, see, e.g., 
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST–BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 77–81 (2008); David A. Dana, 
Valuing Foreign Lives and Settlements, 1 J. BENEFIT–COST ANALYSIS, no. 1, Jan. 2010, at art. 3; James 
K. Hammit, Valuing Changes in Mortality Risk: Lives Saved Versus Life Years Saved, 1 REV. ENVTL. 
ECON. & POL’Y 228 (2007); Ted R. Miller, Variations Between Countries in Values of Statistical Life, 
34 J. TRANSPORT ECON. POL’Y169 (2000); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted 
Value of Life, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 269 (1988). 
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objectively correct because the business of valuing non-market goods is 
inherently subjective and contestable.28 
Aside from valuing death prevention, how do we measure morbidity 
effects that reduce the quality of life but do not kill? What, for example, is 
the value of a single asthma attack averted or a significantly reduced risk of 
a non-fatal cancer from a particular source? Beyond human life and health, 
how do we value ecosystem effects—for example, all of the seabirds, sea 
mammals, and other wildlife killed in the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989?29 
Surely no one could claim with a straight face that answers to these 
questions are objectively discernible in a politically neutral way.30 Values 
must be assigned, however, because otherwise those goods would receive a 
default value of zero in CBAs,31 which is usually, though not inevitably,32 
worse than assigning an erroneous positive value.33 
Once more or less arbitrary values are assigned to non-market goods 
and bads (along with the market values of goods and bads that are regularly 
 
28. Former Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) chief John Graham argues that 
valuation problems have been reduced in recent years by improvements in CBA methodology. John D. 
Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 483–516 
(2008). But absent the metric of money (valuations obtained from actual market exchanges), the 
valuation of non-market goods, such as human lives and human health, must remain substantially 
uncertain and, therefore contestable. See, e.g., Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, On the Value of 
Formal Assessment of Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 154, 154 (2007). 
CBAs can deal with uncertainty, but only imperfectly, e.g., by running “Monte Carlo” simulations that 
generate a probability distribution of outcomes (or values). 
29. See DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 318 
(2005). 
30. As in most other cases involving harm to non-market goods such as wildlife, analysts used 
contingent valuation (CV) techniques in the Exxon Valdez case to determine the extent of damages. 
Some economists believe that CV surveys provide no useful insights as to value. See, e.g., Peter A. 
Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 45, 62 (1994). Others defend the technique as consistent with economic theory and 
necessary to evaluate non-market goods. See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment 
Through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 37–38 (1994). A CV study of the Exxon Valdez 
disaster concluded that the damage to passive use values alone amounted to $2.8 billion. RICHARD T. 
CARSON ET AL., A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY OF LOST PASSIVE USE VALUES RESULTING FROM 
THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, A REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 1-
11 (1992), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6984/. By contrast, the jury in the litigation that 
inevitably followed the oil spill held Exxon responsible for just $287 million in compensatory damages. 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 480–81 (2008). Even assuming no bias on the part of 
either the jury or the economists who undertook the contingent valuation study, no objective basis exists 
for concluding that one valuation was correct or even more accurate than the other. 
31. This stark fact places the onus on critics of CV, such as Diamond and Hausman, supra note 30, 
to offer a preferable substitute. As a practical matter, non-market environmental goods are still 
frequently assigned a value of zero because many agency CBAs, including those of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, exclude the more difficult to evaluate environmental benefits (as opposed to public-
health benefits) of regulatory proposals. 
32. Overestimating values can be just as big a problem as underestimating them. For example, if 
the benefit of some good is $10, assigning it a value of $0 in a CBA would distort the analysis less than 
assigning it a value of $21. 
33. The problem is compounded in a Monte Carlo framework because the assumption of a zero 
value implies that the standard error is also zero. I am grateful to Dave Weimer for this observation. 
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traded), any benefits or costs arising after the initial date of policy 
implementation must be discounted at some rate, including potentially a 
zero rate, to derive their net present value, which is their value at the time 
of policy adoption. The need for discounting is intuitive from the 
perspective of the opportunity cost of investment. Because a dollar today 
can be invested at some positive rate of interest, it is worth more than a 
dollar tomorrow, next year, or in ten years’ time. An alternative but equally 
prominent approach to discounting, based on the marginal rate of time 
preference rather than the opportunity cost of investment, stems from the 
works of Irving Fisher and Frank Ramsey.34 
The marginal rate of time preference approach to discounting differs 
from the opportunity cost of investment approach mainly in that the former 
focuses on deferring (or not) one’s own consumption of some good, while 
the latter focuses not on personal consumption but on maximizing market 
returns from investments.35 In the idealized micro-economy of neoclassical 
theory, the two approaches would lead to identical social discount rates.36 
But because of market imperfections and distortions (resulting, for 
example, from taxes), the two approaches usually specify different discount 
rates.37 Rates based on the opportunity cost of capital run significantly 
higher than those based on the pure rate of time preference.38 
Consequently, the very choice of discounting method can significantly 
affect the outcome of a CBA and thereby influence policy. 
A third approach to discounting uses the so-called “shadow price of 
capital,” which starts by converting all mandated private capital 
expenditures to annualized consumption equivalents using an estimate of 
the pre-tax private rate of return to determine a cost-stream representing 
foregone consumption.39 That foregone consumption is then converted to 
present value, along with all other costs and benefits, using the 
consumption rate of time preference.40 But the shadow price of capital 
approach has not (yet) been widely adopted. The U.K. Treasury 
experimented with it, though only briefly, for government policies and 
 
34. See IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906); F.P. Ramsey, A 
Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928). 
35. See, e.g., M.S. Feldstein, The Social Time Preference Discount Rate in Cost Benefit Analysis, 
74 ECON. J. 360, 361 (1964). 
36. See, e.g., ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS 165 (1st ed. 1996). 
37. David F. Burgess & Richard O. Zerbe, Appropriate Discounting for Benefit–Cost Analysis, 2 J. 
BENEFIT–COST ANALYSIS, no. 2, Apr. 2011, at art. 2. 
38. See id. at 4; BOARDMAN, supra note 36, at 169. 
39. See Jeffrey A. Kolb & Joel D. Scheraga, Discounting the Benefits and Costs of Environmental 
Regulations, 9 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 381, 382 (1990). 
40. See, e.g., id. 
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projects with significant effects on carbon emissions.41 Similarly, in the 
U.S., the OMB briefly experimented with the shadow price of capital 
approach to discounting. A 1992 rule established it as “the analytically 
preferred means of capturing the effects of government projects on 
resource allocation in the private sector,” and even permitted its use with 
“OMB concurrence,” instead of the opportunity cost of capital approach 
with its 7% constant discount rate.42 But just a few years later, the OMB 
cautioned that “[w]hile the shadow price approach is theoretically 
preferred, there are several practical challenges to its use. Agencies wishing 
to use this methodology should consult with the OMB prior to doing so, 
and should clearly explain their solutions to the methodological and 
empirical challenges . . . .”43 In a similar vein, OMB Circular A-4, adopted 
in 2003, cautioned agencies that “shadow prices are not well established for 
the United States. Furthermore, the distribution of impacts from regulations 
on capital and consumption are not always well known. Consequently, any 
agency that wishes to tackle this challenging analytical task should check 
with OMB before proceeding.”44 Since then, OMB rules have mandated 
use of both the opportunity cost of investment approach and the marginal 
 
41. See ECON. GRP., DEP’T FOR ENV’T FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
AND THE SHADOW PRICE OF CARBON: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW TO USE THEM IN ECONOMIC 
APPRAISAL IN THE UK (2007), http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/valuation/shadow 
_cost/shadow_cost.aspx#. Just a couple of years after adopting the shadow price of capital approach to 
valuing carbon emissions, H.M. Treasury abandoned all efforts to price damages from carbon emissions 
to focus instead on the abatement costs of attaining exogenously determined emission-reduction goals. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON VALUATION IN UK POLICY APPRAISAL: A REVISED 
APPROACH (2009), https://www.decc.gov.uk/publications/basket.aspx?FilePath=What+we+do%5CA+ 
low+carbon+UK%5CCarbon+Valuation%5C1_20090715105804_e_%40%40_CarbonValuationinUKPol
icyAppraisal.pdf&filetype=4. See also DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE 
CARBON VALUATION METHODOLOGY FOR UK POLICY APPRAISAL (2011), available at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/cutting-emissions/carbon-valuation/3136-guide-carbon-
valuation-methodology.pdf. 
42. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED 
(Oct. 29, 1992), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094 [hereinafter OMB 
CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED]. 
43. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_riaguide#iii. 
44. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 27, at 33. It is worth noting that the OMB’s changing attitude 
to the shadow price of capital approach to discounting has political overtones, which are consistent with 
the theme of this Article. That approach, which typically leads to lower discount rates than the 
opportunity cost of capital approach, thereby justifying more government action, was embraced shortly 
after a Democratic (Clinton) administration took office, but then pretty firmly abandoned shortly after a 
Republican (Bush II) administration took office, although support for the approach did wane during 
Clinton’s second term. This history supports a more general thesis that debates over CBA methodology 
within the federal government reflect larger disputes about the size and scope of government 
intervention in the economy and illustrates the extent to which CBA can be manipulated to preferred 
political ends. 
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rate of time preference approach to discounting, by requiring the use of 
alternative 7% and 3% discount rates.45 
But how are those values derived? The opportunity cost of capital 
approach simply estimates the before-tax rate of return to private capital in 
the U.S. economy over a number of years.46 The OMB has pegged that rate 
at 7% since the early 1990s (when it was reduced from a 10% rate).47 The 
marginal rate of time preference approach, by contrast, is not based on 
simple market observations. Rather, the discount rate is estimated 
according to the “Ramsey equation,” r=p+ηg, where: r is the social rate of 
discount; p is the pure rate of time preference, a measure of (im)patience; η 
is the elasticity of marginal utility, also known as the base-case coefficient 
of relative risk aversion, which measures the amount of consumption 
society is willing to sacrifice today to ensure against some expected future 
loss; and g represents the expected rate of growth in per capita 
consumption, a value economists typically presume to be positive because 
they expect future generations to be better off than present generations.48 
The g could turn negative, however, should some large-scale disaster occur, 
such as a significant asteroid strike or catastrophic climate change.49 
Indeed, the conventional presumption of long-term growth stems from 
models that presume no resource or ecological constraints of any kind. 
Once such constraints are introduced, the consequences for future 
consumption become more ambiguous (even in the absence of external 
shocks or discontinuities) and depend increasingly on factors including 
relative resource endowments, the elasticity of substitution between natural 
resources and other forms of capital, and the rate of technological change.50 
 
45. Id. 
46. See id. 
47. See OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED, supra note 42, at 9. 
48. On the presumptuousness of this expectation, see, e.g., Robert M. Solow, The Economics of 
Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974), which states that: 
We have actually done quite well at the hands of our ancestors. Given how poor they were 
and how rich we are, they might properly have saved less and consumed more. No doubt 
they never expected the rise in income per head that has made us so much richer than they 
ever dreamed was possible. But that only reinforces the point that the future may be too 
important to be left to the accident of mistaken expectations and the ups and downs of the 
Protestant ethic. 
Id. at 9. See also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981) 
(observing that long-run economic growth is not normal but exceptional in the history of human 
civilization). 
49. As North, supra, note 48, reminds us, low or negative growth situations can arise not just from 
large-scale exogenous shocks but endogenously from persistently bad institutions, which harm society 
overall while benefiting interest groups possessing sufficient political prowess to prevent social 
welfare-enhancing institutional change. 
50. See, e.g., Solow, supra note 48, at 10–11; Joseph Stiglitz, Growth with Exhaustible Natural 
Resources: Efficient and Optimal Growth Paths, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 123 (1974). 
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None of the elements comprising the Ramsey equation can be specified 
objectively. They are all substantially subjective and subject to dispute, as 
illustrated by the controversy that followed the U.K. Treasury’s 2006 
publication of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.51 
The Stern Review derived an unusually low social discount rate of 1.4% 
based on a pure rate of time preference of 0.1%, an elasticity of marginal 
utility of 1, and an expected growth rate in per capita consumption of 
1.3%.52 Many of the Stern Review’s numerous critics objected to its social 
discount rate, but for various reasons. Some, including William Nordhaus 
and Richard S.J. Tol, strongly disagreed with the selection of 0.1% for the 
pure rate of time preference.53 Others, such as Partha Dasgupta, had no 
complaint with the pure rate of time preference but disagreed with the Stern 
Review’s elasticity of marginal utility of 1.54 Dasgupta did not dispute 
Stern’s choice of a growth rate for per capita consumption, even though he 
previously co-authored a paper noting how climate change, if sufficiently 
severe, could curtail economic growth and potentially justify a zero, or 
even negative, social discount rate.55 Martin Weitzman, after heavily 
criticizing the Stern Review’s use of unconventional, paternalistic discount 
rates,56 developed his own integrated assessment model—a complex form 
of CBA fusing scientific and economic analyses—that pays more attention 
to potential low or negative growth scenarios.57 
Given the lack of agreement over the elements that comprise the social 
discount rate, it should not be surprising to find widespread disagreement 
about the social discount rate itself. Writing in 1999, Paul Portney and John 
Weyant observed that “those looking for guidance on the choice of a 
discount rate could find justification [in the literature] for a rate at or near 
zero, as high as 20% and any and all values in between.”58 Not much has 
changed in the years since. The wide range of justifiable social discount 
 
51. Stern, supra note 17. The analysis in this section is adapted from Daniel H. Cole, The Stern 
Review and Its Critics: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Benefit–Cost Analysis, 48 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 53 (2008). 
52. Cole, supra note 51, at 61. 
53. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686 (2007); Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J. Tol, The Stern Review: 
Implications for Climate Change, 49 ENV’T 36 (2007). 
54. See Partha Dasgupta, Commentary: The Stern Review’s Economics of Climate Change, 199 
NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 4 (2007). 
55. Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler & Scott Barrett, Intergenerational Equity, Social Discount 
Rates, and Global Warming, in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 14, at 51. 
56. Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 703 (2007). 
57. Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260 (2001). 
58. DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 14, at 4. See also Feldstein, 
supra note 35, at 362 (observing that “[t]he search for a ‘perfect’ formula to specify the social time 
preference rate is futile. [A social time preference function] must reflect public policy and social ethics, 
as well as judgment about future economic conditions.”). 
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rates is troubling because even a seemingly small difference in the discount 
rate can alter the outcome—in technical terms, change the sign—of a CBA. 
A little more than a decade ago, Martin Weitzman tried to get a better 
handle on what constituted an “appropriate” social discount rate for long-
run environmental policies by surveying 2,000 of his fellow economists for 
their “professionally considered gut feeling” about the appropriate rates to 
apply to climate change policy.59 In the aggregate, they preferred a 
schedule of declining discount rates, starting from around 4% for near-term 
effects and falling to 2% after twenty-five years, then to 1% after seventy-
five years.60 Weitzman’s project has been criticized on various grounds, 
including, for example, that there is no reason to believe that most 
economists have special expertise on discounting.61 However, his findings 
(summarized in Table 1 below) are remarkably consistent with the U.K. 
Treasury’s “Green Book” of discount rates for central government policies, 
presented in Table 2. The U.K. Treasury rates presumably are based on the 
shadow price of capital (presuming risk-free rate of returns) or on the pure 
rate of time preference, rather than the opportunity cost of capital.62 By 
contrast, the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget continues 
to prefer the opportunity cost of capital approach for calculating social 
discount rates.63 Its 7% base rate remains mandatory for all federal agency 
CBAs, even for cases where the proposed government action does not 
primarily affect capital markets.64 In 2003, the OMB instructed agencies to 
use both 7% and 3% discount rates (see Table 3), thereby splitting the 
difference between the opportunity cost of capital approach and the time 
preference of consumption approach to discounting (although, in practice, 
the OMB sometimes seems to give greater weight to calculations using the 









59. Weitzman, supra note 57, at 266 (emphasis omitted). 
60. Id. at 261. 
61. See, e.g., Burgess & Zerbe, supra note 37, at 12. 
62. H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
99 (2003), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf. 
63. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 27. 
64. OMB CIRCULAR A-94 REVISED, supra note 42, subsequently superseded by OMB CIRCULAR 
A-4, supra note 27, as it relates to discounting in RIAs. 
65. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 27. 
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Table 1. Aggregation of Economists’ Recommended Discount Rates for 
Climate Change Policy 
Time from present Discount Rate (%) 
1–5 years 4 
6–25 years 3 
26–75 years 2 
76–300 years 1 
More than 300 years 0 






Table 2. U.K. Treasury’s Schedule of Declining Long-Term Discount Rates 







Source: H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 99 (2003), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf. 
Table 3. The OMB’s Discount Rates for Federal Agencies 
Time period 
Discount rate (%) 
Should be 
used in all 
RIAs 
Should be 
used in all 
RIAs 
Permitted for sensitivity 
analysis in RIAs with 
intergenerational effects  
1+ years 7 3 — 
Intergenerational (more 
than 20 years) 
7 3 1–3 
Source: OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR A-4, in INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2003). 
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Moreover, the OMB permits the use of even lower discount rates, 
ranging from 1%–3%, in RIAs with intergenerational effects for purposes 
of “sensitivity analysis” (along with mandatory 7% and 3% rates).66 Thus, 
OMB rules countenance the use of alternative discount rates, based on 
different presumptions, for regulatory analysis. Policy-makers who say to 
economists, “[j]ust give me a number,”67 instead receive two or more 
numbers, which cannot simply be averaged or otherwise combined into a 
single number, thereby complicating the decision-making process. Indeed, 
it is by no means clear that legislators or high-ranking political appointees 
in the agencies understand or appreciate the nuances of discounting and 
discount-rate choice. This is not to argue that analysts should necessarily 
cater to the desires of politicians and other policy makers for simple 
calculations. Sometimes, at least, decision makers need to be seriously 
confronted with reasonable and potentially irreducible uncertainties. But 
introducing additional complexity into CBA calculations does come at a 
cost. 
To appreciate how using multiple discount rates within a single CBA 
can confuse decision makers, imagine a policy that upon implementation 
would impose costs on polluters and administrators amounting to $1 
million but would produce estimated social benefits of $2 million in exactly 
fifteen years. For the sake of simplicity, assume no costs or benefits are 
created during the intervening years. 
While this example is highly stylized, it captures a chief characteristic 
of certain public policies, such as environmental protection measures: costs 
tend to be front-loaded, while benefits tend to be back-loaded. The costs 
that are borne now (in year 0) are not subject to discounting, but the 
subsequent benefits are discounted. The standard discounting equation is 
PV = FV/(1+i)t, where PV is present value, FV is future value, i is the 
annual interest rate, and t is the time.68 The algebraic “discount factor,” 1/(1 
+ i)t, can be used to generate a table of numerical discount factors for 
different time periods. The discount factor for a 3% discount rate in fifteen 
 
66. “Sensitivity analysis” denotes a test carried out to determine the extent to which the outcome of 
a CBA is an artifact of the analyst’s assumptions. The goal (not always attainable) is to prevent 
analysts’ subjective choices from determining CBA results. A policy that is “insensitive” to the choice 
of a 3% or 7% discount rate—net social benefits are derived using either rate—is more certain to 
enhance net social welfare than a policy that provides net social benefits under the lower, but not the 
higher, discount rate. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that only policies that provide net 
social benefits under discount rates of both 3% and 7% should be implemented; that would be 
tantamount to using a single discount rate of 7%. Arguably, for policies that do not primarily and 
substantially affect capital markets, the use of 7% discount rate in the CBA is unwarranted, even as part 
of a sensitivity analysis. 
67. Mark A. Moore et al., “Just Give Me a Number!” Practical Values for the Social Discount 
Rate, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 789, 789 (2004). 
68. NICK HANLEY & CLIVE L. SPLASH, COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16 
(1993). 
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years is 0.642; the discount factor for a 7% discount rate in fifteen years is 
0.362. Applying these discount factors to the current hypothetical, using the 
OMB’s mandatory 7% discount rate, the present value (that is, the value in 
year 0) of $2 million in benefits accrued in year 15 is $724,000 (2,000,000 
x 0.362). Because that product is less than the costs incurred in year 0 
(1,000,000), the policy would not pass the cost–benefit test and should not 
be implemented. But using the alternative 3% discount rate, the present 
value of the benefits earned in year 15 is $1,284,000 (2,000,000 x 0.642), 
which exceeds the cost, and therefore passes the cost–benefit test. What 
should the government do with this information? If it relies on the 3% 
discount rate, it should implement the policy; but if it uses the 7% discount 
rate, it should not. One way or the other, the inherently subjective choice of 
a discount rate alone determines the CBA’s outcome and drives the policy 
decision.69 
Given the various subjective and manipulable elements of CBA, why 
does government increasingly rely on it as a tool in policymaking? The 
reasons are several: (1) despite the subjective elements described above, 
CBAs have an aura of neutrality and appear more scientific than other 
decision tools; (2) decision makers like CBAs because they can boil down 
fundamental questions of regulatory policy to a single number (or a set of 
numbers, reflecting a clearly delineated variation in parameter values or a 
probability distribution of outcomes, if a Monte Carlo simulation is run), 
which creates the impression (or misimpression) that the policy choice is 
(at least relatively speaking) clear;70 (3) even if CBAs are subjective and 
manipulable, other decision tools are no less subjective and manipulable; 
and (4) because formal CBAs specify assumptions, valuations, discount 
rates and other variables, they are relatively transparent and capable of 
replication or challenge.71 
The last two reasons are probably sufficient to warrant CBAs for most, 
if not all, major regulatory decisions (but perhaps not for minor decisions 
where the costs of performing the CBA may not be worth the benefits). 
Problems of subjectivity and manipulability affect all decision tools, but in 
the absence of a formalized process such as CBA, assumptions and 
valuations are likely to remain unspecified and opaque, preventing policy 
analysts, the media, and interest groups from reviewing, challenging, 
 
69. Accord Aaron Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost–Benefit Analysis, Systems 
Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 297 (1966). 
70. It should be noted that many (if not all) economists who advocate the use of CBA in regulatory 
decision making do so not as a decision-rule but as one source of information among others. See 
Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit–Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221 (1996). 
71. See Wildavsky, supra note 69, at 297 (“The great advantage of cost–benefit analysis, when 
pursued with integrity, is that some implicit judgments are made explicit and subject to analysis.”). 
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replicating, or even simply understanding why a particular decision was 
taken, rather than some other decision.72 Indeed, decision makers 
sometimes have strategic incentives to prefer the relative opacity of 
informal decision-making procedures. Particularly in such circumstances, 
the transparency offered by formal CBAs is a great virtue, which should 
not be underestimated.73 It can, and has, served to check abuses in agency 
decision-making processes, as the next section illustrates. 
II. THE USE AND ABUSE OF CBA IN PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS 
This section offers three case studies that, together, describe legitimate 
uses as well as abuses of CBA to either resolve or impede the resolution of 
social-cost problems. The first case study concerns CBAs prepared by the 
EPA in the late 1990s in support of revised national ambient air quality 
standards for ozone and particulate matter. The main lesson of that case 
study is that it makes sense for the EPA to support its rules with CBAs even 
when it is legally barred from considering them in rulemaking because they 
help to undercut political opposition to new rules. 
The second case study concerns the Obama Administration’s more 
recent but unsuccessful effort to replace the George W. Bush 
Administration’s air quality standard for ozone with a more stringent 
standard. Relenting in the face of political opposition based partly on the 
state of the economy, the Obama Administration was disabled from 
defending its proposed standards on economic grounds because the 
agency’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis showed that the Bush standard 
yielded (on central estimates) higher net social benefits. 
The third case study focuses on the EPA’s efforts to support the Bush 
Administration’s “Clear Skies” program—a deceptively named legislative 
package designed mainly to avoid imposing tougher restrictions on 
 
72. One group that seems immune (or, at least, resistant) to the information provided by CBAs is 
the general public. As Cass Sunstein has observed in the context of the Bush Administration’s 
reconsideration of Clinton Administration drinking water standards for arsenic, “Ordinary people seem 
to be ‘intuitive toxicologists,’ with a set of simple rules for thinking about environmental risks.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2262 (2002). Sunstein goes on to argue that 
such intuitive approaches to policy are likely to lead to mistaken judgments and socially-inefficient 
outcomes, strengthening the case for CBA as a corrective. Id. at 2266. The controversy over the arsenic 
rule is discussed further infra notes 137 and 166. 
73. Lisa Heinzerling argues that the transparency of CBA is illusory because agency explanations 
of policies based on CBAs are not obviously more transparent than agency explanations of policies not 
based on CBAs. See Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311, 2335–37 (2002). 
However, her argument conflates two distinct issues: (1) the transparency of CBAs and (2) the 
transparency of decisions based, in whole or in part, on CBAs. Nothing in CBAs guarantees that agency 
decisions, or explanations of decisions, will be any more transparent. But the CBAs themselves must be 
transparent and replicable—assumptions, including valuations of non-market goods and discount rates, 
must be explicit—to qualify as legitimate CBAs. And their transparency has, in fact, contributed 
positively to policy-making, as shown by the third case study in Part II., infra. 
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polluters—by manipulating the economic analysis to make “Clear Skies” 
appear superior to alternative, more stringent policies.74 While this case 
demonstrates the manipulability of CBAs, it also highlights the value of 
their transparency for determining best policies for providing public goods 
or resolving collective-action problems. 
These three case studies are not intended to present a comprehensive 
picture of the myriad uses and abuses of CBA in political/regulatory 
processes; many more case studies would be required to accomplish that 
goal. Those presented here should be sufficient, however, to accomplish the 
more modest aim of this Article, which is to describe and assess some of 
the more important ways in which CBAs have in fact been: (1) used to (a) 
support social welfare-enhancing regulations and (b) impede regulations 
that would likely reduce social welfare; and (2) abused to mislead policy 
makers, and the public, about the social welfare consequences of favored or 
disfavored regulatory or legislative proposals. The case studies presented 
here do not describe the full range of uses and abuses of CBA but suggest 
some implications and conclusions about the overall utility of the method 
as a decision tool. 
Case Study 1: CBA Can Facilitate Collective Action by Disarming Political 
Opposition 
In 1997, the EPA proposed amendments75 to national ambient air 
quality standards (NAAQSs) for ozone and particulate matter under the 
Clean Air Act.76 The proposed regulations, which the EPA ultimately 
adopted, were significantly more stringent than the previous standards, and 
entailed substantial costs for both regulated industries and cities that could 
not immediately attain the new standards.77 In setting the revised standards, 
however, the EPA was legally barred from considering those costs. Section 
109 of the Clean Air Act requires the agency to set primary NAAQSs that 
allow “an adequate margin of safety . . . to protect the public health.”78 
Since its inception, the EPA has consistently interpreted that language to 
prohibit considerations of cost in setting or revising NAAQSs.79 That 
 
74. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & LARRY B. PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33165, COSTS 
AND BENEFITS OF CLEAR SKIES: EPA’S ANALYSIS OF MULTI-POLLUTANT CLEAN AIR BILLS (2005). 
75. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652-01 (July 
18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. prt. 50). 
76. Clean Air Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 
et seq. (2006)). 
77. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1999) (particulate matter standard); 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9 to 50.10 (1999) 
(ozone standard). 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006). 
79. See Lead Industries Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir., 1980) 
(upholding the EPA’s interpretation of § 109 of the Clean Air Act to prohibit cost considerations in 
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interpretation is based in part on the fact that other provisions in the Clean 
Air Act expressly permit or even require consideration of costs,80 
suggesting that Congress’s failure to include any reference to costs in § 109 
was both deliberate and legally significant (if, perhaps, economically 
imprudent). 
Although the EPA is statutorily barred from considering costs in 
setting revised NAAQSs, the agency nevertheless prepares CBAs in setting 
or revising those standards because it is legally obligated to do so by a 
different statute and an executive order. The 1995 Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act requires federal agencies to conduct cost–benefit analyses of 
all regulations entailing annual economic costs of $100 million or more.81 
The Act also requires the agencies to adopt the economically least 
burdensome regulatory alternative that accomplishes the regulatory purpose 
or to explain why they chose a different option.82 Executive Order (E.O.) 
12,866, issued in 1993 by President Clinton, required executive branch 
agencies, including the EPA, to prepare cost–benefit analyses for any 
“significant” regulatory proposals, that is, proposals having annual 
economic effects of $100 million or more.83 Unlike the Reagan era E.O. it 
superseded,84 however, the Clinton E.O. did not require that the benefits of 
proposed regulations exceed the costs.85 It did, however, require the EPA to 
prepare CBAs, even when it could not legally consider them in making 
regulatory decisions, as when setting national ambient air quality standards 
under the Clean Air Act.86 
The EPA complied with both the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
E.O. 12,866 by duly preparing CBAs for its proposed revisions to the 
NAAQSs for ozone and particulate matter.87 The CBA for the ozone 
standard failed a strict cost–benefit test, with estimated benefits ranging 
from $0.1–$1.5 billion (net present value) and estimated costs of $2.5 
 
setting or revising NAAQSs); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (confirming 
the EPA’s interpretation that costs cannot be considered in setting NAAQSs). 
80. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006) (expressly requiring the EPA to consider costs in 
establishing technology-based standards of performance for new stationary sources of pollution 
emissions). 
81. 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658(g) (2006). 
82. Id. 
83. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993). The Clinton E.O. has since been 
amended by E.O.’s promulgated by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. See Exec. Order 
No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28, 2002); Exec. Order 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007); 
Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
84. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981); Exec. Order 12,498, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985). 
85. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
86. Id. 
87. See Lester B. Lave, EPA’s Proposed Air Quality Standards: Clean Air Sense, The Brookings 
Institute, Summer 1997, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-environment-
lave. All figures are in 1997 dollars. 
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billion.88 By contrast, the CBA for the revised particulate matter NAAQS 
had estimated benefits of $58–$110 billion, which exceeded by at least a 
factor of ten the estimated cost of $6 billion.89 But was this exercise in 
CBA simply a waste of time and resources? Perhaps, if one is prepared to 
believe the EPA actually refrained from considering costs in deciding 
whether or not to change the standards. The fact that the EPA has only 
rarely changed NAAQSs, even though the Clean Air Act requires it to 
consider doing so at least every five years,90 suggests that cost does play an 
important, if informal, role in the EPA’s decision making. But even if the 
EPA set the revised NAAQSs for ozone and particulate matter without 
regard to its own CBAs, those CBAs came in very handy when the agency 
was forced to defend its revised standards against political opposition in 
Congress. 
As Jason Scott Johnston has observed, “When agencies pursue policies 
or programs that are opposed by party leaders, they risk triggering 
congressional reaction, not only in the form of costly oversight hearings, at 
which they will be grilled for hours by hostile committee members, but also 
in the form of reduced future appropriations.”91 Congress may also attempt 
to nullify or overturn regulatory policies through legislation, as the EPA 
discovered when it revised the NAAQSs for ozone and particulate matter in 
1997. The regulations provoked a great hue and cry from cities and 
industries that would bear significant new costs under the regulations.92 
The Republican-controlled House and Senate held oversight hearings on 
the new standards,93 and proposals were made in Congress to undo them.94 
But those efforts went nowhere. That in itself is not unusual; exceedingly 
 
88. Id. 
89. See id. 
90. 42 USC § 7409(d)(2)(B) (2006). 
91. Jason Scott Johnston, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory 
Cost–Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1362 (2002). Johnston’s game theoretic model of 
agency behavior relative to CBA focuses on litigation/judicial review rather than legislative/regulatory 
oversight. 
92. See, e.g., Vicki Torres, Firms Push for Some Breathing Room, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at 
D9; Cleaner Air? Tougher standards pose a headache for cities and states, HOUS. CHRON., July 14, 
1997, at 20; James M. Lents, A Review of National Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Quality Standards 
in Light of Long-Standing California Air Quality Standards, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 415, 415–16 (1998). 
93. See, e.g., Clean Air Act: Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards: Hearings Before the Senate 
Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety and the Comm. on 
Environment and Public Works, 105th Cong. 105-50 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings], 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg45560/pdf/CHRG-105shrg45560.pdf. 
94. See, e.g., S. 1084, 105th Cong. (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c105:S.1084.IS: (bill to reinstate original ozone and particulate matter standards); H.R. 
1984, 105th Cong. (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.1984.IH: (bill 
to impose four-year moratorium on new ozone and particulate matter standards). 
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few legislative proposals ever become law.95 In this case, however, it is 
worth considering whether the CBAs the EPA prepared for its revised 
ozone and particulate matter standards might have helped at least to quell 
the opposition. The net benefits of the particulate matter standard were so 
immense as to be robust to any reasonable sensitivity analyses (e.g., 
altering of the discount rate), and so could well have pulled the rug out 
from under the EPA’s opponents. 
Whether the CBAs prepared by the EPA affected the outcome of the 
policy dispute in Congress is, of course, speculative. A cursory review of 
the Senate’s hearings on the NAAQSs indicates that they may have had an 
effect, as senators who opposed the standards expressly denied that the 
issue was economic (in stark contrast to arguments raised about the Obama 
Administration’s proposed changes in the ozone standards, addressed in the 
next case study).96 Instead, senators focused their attacks on the scientific 
basis for the standards, which was, in fact, quite strong.97 Apparently, they 
realized that even if they amended § 109 of the Clean Air Act to require 
that NAAQSs be based on a cost–benefit analysis, this provision would not 
avail them, at least in the case of the revised particulate matter standard.98 
This case study shows that, even in cases where CBAs are not legally 
required or cannot be legally considered, they may play the valuable 
political role of muting political opposition that otherwise might succeed in 
overturning welfare-enhancing regulations.99 By the same token, a carefully 
prepared CBA indicating that a proposed regulatory change would create 
significant net social costs can negate political support for such a change, 
as the next case study illustrates. 
Case Study II: CBA Exposes and Impedes Inefficient Regulation 
If CBA proved politically beneficial to the EPA’s efforts to strengthen 
ozone standards in the late 1990s, it probably contributed to the downfall of 
a similar Obama Administration effort in 2011. The story begins in 2008 
 
95. In the 109th Congress, the Senate and House considered a total of 10,537 proposals, according 
to the Library of Congress’s Thomas.gov website. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Browse.php?n=bills&c=109 (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). According to the 
same site, 483 bills, or 4.5% of those proposals, were signed by the President. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php (search for bills signed by President during the 109th 
Congress) (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
96. See Hearings, supra note 93. 
97. Id. 
98. Both rules were upheld on judicial review. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457 
(2001). However, litigation on technical issues did succeed in delaying implementation of the 1997 
ozone standard. See, e.g., Allison D. Wood, Implementing EPA’s 8-Hour Ozone Standard, Round Two, 
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2004, at 16. 
99. This assumes, of course, that the agency’s CBA was accurate at least with respect to the “sign” 
of net benefits or costs. 
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when, pursuant to a mandatory five-year review of the national ambient air 
quality standards for ozone, the George W. Bush Administration 
announced that it would amend the standard set in 1997 by the Clinton 
Administration from 84 parts per billion (ppb) to 75 ppb.100 Oddly for a 
proposal to strengthen environmental standards—a rare enough event 
during the Bush Administration—environmentalists and even EPA’s own 
scientists were outraged. The EPA’s scientific advisory committee (SAC) 
had unanimously recommended setting the new standard no higher, and 
preferably lower, than 70 ppb.101 After EPA Administrator Stephen 
Johnson published the new 75 ppb standard, in a rule that expressly 
referred to the SAC’s findings but ignored its recommendations, the SAC 
took the highly unusual step of sending Administrator Johnson a 
unanimous follow-up letter expressing its disappointment and disagreement 
with the new standard.102 
Why did the Bush EPA select a new ozone standard significantly 
higher (i.e., less stringent) than its own SAC recommended? The final rule 
referred to “uncertainties” about health effects at lower ambient 
concentration levels of ozone.103 In the press, Administrator Johnson 
explained that he took the SAC’s recommendations into account but simply 
disagreed with them.104 But why did he disagree with them? The RIA for 
the rule suggests the answer. It compared the costs and benefits of various 
standards, including 65 ppb, 70 ppb, 75 ppb, and 79 ppb, using alternative 
3% and 7% discount rates.105 The net benefits of the selected standard of 75 
ppb, based on the median value of all point estimates, amounted to $0.8 
billion.106 The 79 ppb alternative had a similar cost–benefit profile but 
would have been even harder for the Bush Administration to defend on 
scientific grounds.107 The more stringent standards preferred by the SAC 
would have entailed significantly lower net social benefits or even net 
social costs (on central estimates) according to the Bush EPA’s 
 
100. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,439 (Mar. 
27, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 58). 
101. See Letter from Dr. Rogene Henderson, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Comm. to 
Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 24, 2006), at 1–2, 
http://envirohealth.berkeley.edu/271E/2007/S5/CASACtoEPAOct2006Ozone.pdf. 
102. See id. 
103. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,437 
(proposed Mar. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 58). 
104. Associated Press, States, Activists Sue EPA over New Smog Rules, May 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24846273/ns/us_news-environment/t/states-activists-sue-epa-over-new-
smog-rules/. 
105. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-08-003, FINAL OZONE NAAQS REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS, 7-5 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/452_R_08_003.pdf. 
106. See id. at 7-6. 
107. Id. 
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calculations.108 Of course, Administrator Johnson could not have publicly 
defended his decision revising the standard to 75 ppb, instead of a more 
stringent standard, based on that CBA. To do so would have been to 
confess a deliberate violation of the Clean Air Act. 
EPA scientists, environmental groups, and state officials were 
unconvinced by Administrator Johnson’s facile defense of the new 75 ppb 
ozone standard. On May 27, 2008, the American Lung Association, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Earth Justice, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and other non-governmental plaintiffs filed a notice of intent to 
sue.109 The same day, fourteen state attorneys general filed suit in the D.C. 
Circuit, claiming that EPA’s ozone standard was arbitrary and capricious 
because it ignored the recommendations of its own scientific advisory 
committee without reasonable explanation.110 
Before the case could be heard, the Bush Administration left office and 
the Obama Administration took over. In short order, the Obama EPA 
announced its intention of settling the states’ lawsuit by reconsidering its 
predecessor’s ozone standard.111 On November 1, 2010, EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson filed a motion in the D.C. Circuit requesting 
abeyance of the lawsuit, while her agency proceeded with a promised 
reconsideration of the Bush Administration’s 75 ppb standard for ozone.112 
The plaintiffs asked the court to hold the EPA’s feet to the fire by requiring 
an expedited rulemaking for reconsidering the standards.113 The EPA 
responded with a revised motion for abeyance on December 8, 2010, 
 
108. See id. at 7-6, fig. 7.1. It is instructive to compare the Bush Administration’s RIA for its 2008 
ozone rule with the RIA prepared by the Obama Administration pursuant to its reconsideration of that 
rule. See infra, Table 4. Apparently, the few minor methodological changes introduced by the Obama 
EPA yielded higher net social benefits for each alternative standard considered, without any changes in 
the social discount rate. Those methodological changes included: (1) removal (as recommended by the 
National Academy of Sciences) of the Bush Administration’s assumption of no causality for ozone 
mortality; (2) the inclusion of two additional ozone multi-city studies (again, as recommended by the 
NAS); and (3) upward revision of the value of a statistical life to make it consistent with the value used 
in other EPA analyses. See EPA, SUMMARY OF THE UPDATED REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA) 
FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE 2008 OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARD 
(NAAQS), S1-1 to S1-2, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/s1supplemental_analysis_summary11-5-09.pdf. 
109. See Petition for Review at 1, Am. Lung Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-1203 (D.C. 
Cir., May 27, 2008), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/legal_docs/ 
petition-for-review.pdf. 
110. Timothy Gardner, States Sue EPA over Ozone Pollution Standards, REUTERS, May 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/28/us-ozone-suit-states-idUSN284310 
8220080528. 
111. Brent Kendall, EPA to Reconsider Bush-Era Smog Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2009, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125310162132515625.html. 
112. EPA’s Revised Motion Requesting a Continued Abeyance and Response to the State 
Petitioners’ Cross-Motion, at 3 Mississippi v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/ozonepollution/pdfs/20101208motion.pdf. 
113. Id. 
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stipulating an August 12, 2011 deadline for final action, to which the court 
agreed.114 As we shall see, the Obama EPA’s decision to voluntarily 
reconsider the Bush Administration’s ozone standard—rather than wait for 
a court order that probably would have vacated the rule—was politically 
shortsighted. 
While the Obama Administration held hearings and reviewed the 
science upon which the Bush rule had been based, electric utilities and 
other industries that would bear the brunt of costly emissions reductions 
necessary to meet a more stringent standard vocally opposed any change in 
the rule.115 When a new Republican majority took over in the U.S. House 
of Representatives following the 2010 midterm elections, they started 
referring to the EPA as a “job-killing” agency that was obstructing a return 
to economic growth in the U.S.116 Unfortunately, in the case of the ozone 
standard, their generally baseless arguments correlating job increases or 
losses to social welfare received a modicum of support from the Obama 
EPA’s revised RIA, as described in Table 4 below. The proposed rule 
passed a cost–benefit test (on median estimates), but the Bush 
Administration’s 0.075 ppm standard was found to yield higher (median) 
net social benefits than the alternative Obama standards of 0.070 ppm or 














114. See id. 
115. See Letter from Andrew N. Liveris, Chairman & CEO, Dow Chem. Co. to Hon. William 
Daley, Chief of Staff to the President (July 15, 2011), http://thehill.com/images/stories/blogs/energy/ 
brt.pdf. 
116. See Ben German, Upton’s Agenda: Kill the House Climate Change Committee, Battle “Job 
Killing” EPA Rules, THE HILL, E2 WIRE (Oct. 19, 2010, 10:55 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-
wire/677-e2-wire/124795-uptons-agenda-kill-the-house-climate-change-committee-battle-job-killing-
epa-rules; Erica Martinson, EPA to Be GOP Target in 2012, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2011, 10:35 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68265.html. The casual presumption correlating social 
welfare with the number of jobs in the economy is, of course, fallacious. A policy that maximizes a 
social welfare function may reduce, increase, or leave unchanged the overall rate of (un)employment. 
For this reason, employment effects of regulatory policies are not part of agency CBAs, although they 
are often included separately in RIAs. 
COLE 55 – 89  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012 11:26 AM 
78 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 64:1:55 
Table 4. The EPA’s Estimated Median Net Social Benefits of Alternative 
Ozone Standards in 2008 and 2010 (aggregating point estimates under both 
7% and 3% discount rates) 
Standard 0.075 ppm* 0.070 ppm 0.065 ppm 
Bush 
RIA 
$0.9 billion -$4.0 billion -$9.0 billion 
Obama 
RIA 
$3.1 billion $1.4 billion $0.7 billion 
* Bush Administration’s chosen standard 
Source: EPA, SUMMARY OF THE UPDATED REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
(RIA) FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE 2008 OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARD (NAAQS), S3-19, fig. S3.6 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/s1-supplemental_analysis_full.pdf. 
 
As the deadline loomed for the Obama EPA’s final decision on 
reconsideration of the Bush ozone standard, the economic recovery 
stagnated and the national unemployment rate hovered stubbornly around 
9%.117 President Obama’s job-approval rating fell to a low of 43.5%,118 just 
as he was preparing to launch his reelection campaign. In the 
circumstances, he could scarce afford to squander precious political capital 
on new or revised environmental rules that would not clearly and 
demonstrably improve net social welfare relative to existing standards. 
Notwithstanding strong scientific support for tougher standards and the 
Clean Air Act’s blanket prohibition on cost-considerations in the setting or 
revising of national ambient air quality standards, the perceived political 
costs of ignoring the economic costs of EPA’s rulemaking were simply too 
high. Consequently, on September 2, 2011 President Obama told EPA 
Administrator Jackson to abandon reconsideration of the Bush 
Administration’s ozone standard.119 
The President and other administration officials offered several, not 
entirely consistent or convincing, reasons for withdrawing the new ozone 
proposal. Cass Sunstein, head of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) within the OMB, provided a straightforward economic 
justification for the decision: “We’re committed to protecting public health 
 
117. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—August 2011 (Sept. 2, 
2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_09022011.pdf. 
118. See President Obama Job Approval, REALCLEARPOLITICS.COM, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_obama_job_approval-1044.html (adjust date 
range on approval rating graph to show data for Jan. 2009–Sept. 2011) (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
119. See John M. Broder, Obama Administration Abandons a Stricter Limit on Air Pollution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, at A1. 
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and welfare, but in a way that’s attuned to the economic situation.”120 
While that was an accurate statement of the OIRA’s mission within the 
OMB, it directly conflicts with § 109 of the Clean Air Act, which requires 
the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards based only on the best 
available science concerning health effects.121 No doubt for that reason, the 
official “return letter” Sunstein sent to the EPA Administrator on 
September 2, under President Obama’s instruction, did not mention cost 
but focused instead on regulatory “uncertainty” the proposed rule would 
create for affected industries and municipalities, especially given the 
statutory requirement that the rule be reconsidered yet again in 2013.122 The 
President, himself, focused on the issue of timing: “Ultimately, I did not 
support asking State and local governments to begin implementing a new 
standard that will soon be reconsidered.”123 
The President’s assertion was technically accurate but misleading. The 
Clean Air Act requires reconsideration of national ambient air quality 
standards for each regulated (“criteria”) pollutant every five years.124 The 
ozone standard is, as noted, scheduled for statutory review again in 2013;125 
it must be reviewed then regardless of what the EPA did in 2011 (with 
potential judicial review of a 2011 EPA rule stretching into 2012 or even 
2013). The President’s expressed concern with asking state and local 
governments to implement a new standard that would soon be reconsidered 
is itself a cost consideration and reflects his political calculation that new, 
more stringent ozone standards, established prior to the 2012 presidential 
election, were not worth defending.126 
Political and economic cost calculations aside, the President’s 
expressed concern with the mandatory 2013 review of the ozone standard 
was misleading because five-year reviews of NAAQSs only rarely result in 
 
120. Juliet Eilperin & Peter Wallsten, Obama’s Strategy Confounds Allies, Foes, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 4, 2011 at A1 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs). According 
to a New York Times exposé about the ozone decision, Sunstein had been “itching to send a return 
letter” to “make his mark” as OIRA chief. John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on 
Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at A20. Whether or not that is true, he could not have issued a 
“return letter” based on cost considerations, as the article suggests, because of the plain language of the 
statute forbidding consideration of costs in setting NAAQSs. 
121. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
122. Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson, 
Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_ 
national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf. 
123. Presidential Statement on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 2011 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 605 (Sept. 2, 2011). But see Broder, supra note 120, at A1 (claiming that, in addition 
to the timing issue, the President was concerned with “the cost and the uncertainty it would impose on 
industry and local governments”). 
124. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (2006). 
125. See Letter from Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1. 
126. See Broder, supra note 119. 
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actual changes to the standards.127 New standards set in 2011 would not 
necessarily have to be changed again in 2013. Moreover, the 
Administration must have known about the mandatory five-year review at 
the time it asked the D.C. Circuit for an abeyance from filed lawsuits to 
reconsider the Bush standards.128 If timing was not an issue in late 2010, 
why was it suddenly an issue in mid-2011? Perhaps the President was 
simply signaling his base of his intention to resurrect the revised ozone 
standards in 2013, should he be reelected in 2012.129 It is clear, in any case, 
that his decision not to reset the ozone standards in 2011 was not based 
solely on science, as the Clean Air Act expressly requires. 
To what extent did the RIA contribute to President Obama’s decision 
to abandon reconsideration of the ozone standards? According to a New 
York Times story, it played a significant (though not the only) part.130 
Moreover, we can observe that the Administration has not similarly 
retreated from other proposed environmental regulations, including new 
rules for mercury emissions from powerplants.131 As it happens, the RIA 
for the mercury proposal indicates sizeable net social benefits ranging from 
$37 billion to $90 billion (using a 3% discount rate), and those net benefits 
are relatively insensitive to the choice of a 3% or 7% discount rate.132 The 
mercury rule was finalized on December 16, 2011.133 Time will tell 
whether the highly positive CBA successfully insulates it from a threatened 
rollback by Congress.134 If the first case study of this Article is any 
indication, Congress should find it more difficult to do so because the 
regulation provides clear, demonstrable, and defensible net social benefits. 
In any case, the Obama Administration is not backtracking from its 
 
127. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 870 F. 2d 892, 898–99 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that 
revision of NAAQSs is not mandatory after the Administrator’s review). 
128. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
129. This is not to say that President Obama was either right or wrong to abandon reconsideration 
of the Bush ozone standards. The analysis here is positive, not normative. However, the decision 
evidently was based on considerations of cost—both economic and political—despite the plain 
language of the Clean Air Act. 
130. Broder, supra note 119. 
131. See Eilperin & Wallsten, supra note 120. 
132. Using a 7% discount rate, the range of net social benefits is $33 billion to $81 billion. U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-011, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL 
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, ES-1 (2011), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/ 
matsriafinal.pdf. 
133. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR 
POLLUTANTS FROM COAL- AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS AND 
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR FOSSIL-FUEL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY, INDUSTRIAL-
COMMERCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL, AND SMALL INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL STEAM 
GENERATING UNITS (2011), http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111216MATSfinal.pdf. 
134. See Lee Bergquist, Congress Likely to Challenge EPA’s Proposed Mercury-Emission Rules, 
MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2011, available at http://www.jsonline.com/business/118140259. 
html. 
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proposed mercury rule despite attacks from the right on costly and “job-
killing” EPA regulations. The question arises, would President Obama have 
stood by the mercury rule had its CBA been negative, as with the 
reconsidered ozone standard? Also, would he have abandoned 
reconsideration of the ozone standard, had its CBA shown greater social 
benefits? 
The takeaway lesson from this case study is that costs, both economic 
and political, appear to matter, even when the law says they cannot. 
However, while costs always matter, they are not always decisive. In the 
past, the EPA has promulgated regulations, including national air quality 
standards, which have failed to provide (according to the EPA’s own 
estimates) significant net social benefits.135 For example, the EPA’s RIA 
for its 1997 revisions of the ozone NAAQSs derived a range of net benefits 
from negative $0.7 billion to positive $1.0 billion, which yields a central 
estimate little better than break even.136 Just how much of a role CBA will 
play in the success or failure of any regulation is difficult to predict before 
the fact. Costs always matter, but so too do other important, sometimes 
countervailing, considerations and circumstances.137 Cost apparently has 
been no object, for example, in the promulgation of new and very costly 
“homeland security” regulations since “9/11.”138 
 
135. Arguably, it is becoming more difficult for agencies to do so, given the increased regulatory 
oversight exercised by the OMB, not to mention congressional committees. 
136. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE 
MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE 
RULE, ES-20 (1997), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria/ria0-5.pdf. In that case, it was 
politically helpful that the ozone rule was packaged together with a new particulate matter (PM) 
standard, which had very high net social benefits, so that the combined net benefits from both rules 
were quite high. Had the ozone standard been issued by itself, the somewhat negative cost–benefit 
balance might have made it more susceptible to political reversal. 
137. Shortly after President George W. Bush took office, the EPA announced that it was 
suspending and reconsidering the Clinton Administration’s lately-adopted drinking water standard for 
arsenic under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) (2006). That effort was abandoned in the 
face of strong public opposition to weakening drinking water standards for known carcinogens. See 
Sunstein, supra note 72, at 2262. The Clinton rule had reset the standard from 50 parts per billion (ppb) 
to 10 ppb. The CBA for the standard strongly supported a tightening of the standard from the 
preexisting 50 parts per billion, but was ambiguous as to whether social welfare would be maximized 
with the standard at 10 ppb or 20 ppb. In reconsidering the Clinton rule, the Bush Administration did 
not propose returning to the status quo ante, but instead wanted to raise the standard from 10 ppb to 20 
ppb. The real stakes at issue got lost in the political battle, which ultimately forced the Bush 
Administration to reinstate the Clinton rule of 10 ppb. The outcome of that battle was not significantly 
affected by the EPA’s CBA, but it did spur an interesting colloquy on the legitimacy of CBA in the 
regulatory process, published in the Georgetown Law Review. See Sunstein, supra note 72; Heinzerling, 
supra note 73; Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002); Cass 
R. Sunstein, In Praise of Numbers: A Reply, 90 GEO. L.J. 2379 (2002). 
138. See generally JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM 
INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM (2006); JOHN 
MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, 
AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2011). 
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Case Study III: Blatant Abuse of CBA and the Vital Check of 
Transparency139 
In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush Administration promoted a 
group of bills known collectively as “Clear Skies,” which together would 
have required a 70% reduction in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions by 2018, although actual attainment probably would have been 
delayed until 2026 or later because of the legislation’s expansive “banking” 
provisions.140 The ostensible goal of “Clear Skies” was to deal 
comprehensively with air pollution from the electric power industry. In 
2003, that industry was responsible for 72% of all sulfur dioxide emissions, 
24% of nitrogen oxide emissions, and 41% of carbon dioxide emissions, 
and more than 40% of all mercury emissions in the United States.141 
Powerplant emissions of some pollutants—notably sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides—had been trending downwards thanks mainly to the acid 
rain program of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.142 However, utilities 
had long complained about the “complexity” of the “multilayered and 
interlocking patchwork of controls” applied to them.143 
A more simplified and uniform approach to power-plant regulation had 
been evolving for several years, pursuant to existing statutory mandates, 
within the EPA.144 But the Bush Administration and Congress offered 
several legislative proposals that would have regulated utility emissions of 
major air pollutants in a more comprehensive and integrated way. 
Competing with “Clear Skies” were two legislative proposals, one 
sponsored by Senator James M. Jeffords (I-Vt.) and the other by Senator 
Thomas R. Carper (D-Del.).145 Like the Bush Administration bill, those 
proposals would have permitted banking and trading of allowances, but 
unlike “Clear Skies,” they would have required greater overall emissions 
reductions on shorter deadlines.146 In addition, the Jeffords and Carper 
bills, but not “Clear Skies,” would have imposed regulatory controls to 
reduce utility emissions of carbon dioxide to mitigate climate change.147 
 
139. This case study is adapted, in revised form, from Daniel H. Cole, ‘Best Practice’ Standards 
for Regulatory Benefit–Cost Analysis, 23 RESOURCES L. & ECON. 1, 16–18 (2007). 
140. Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives in Silver Spring, 
Maryland, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 232 (Feb. 14, 2002). 
141. MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 2. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 5. 
144. See id. at 2–3. 
145. Id. at 9–11. See generally Clean Power Act of 2005, S. 150, 109th Cong. (2005) (detailing the 
specifics of the Jeffords proposal); Clean Air Planning Act of 2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003) 
(detailing the specifics of the Carper proposal. 
146. MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 3–4; see also S. 150 §§ 704–06; S. 843, §§ 702–04. 
147. Id. 
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On October 27, 2005, the EPA published a CBA, comprised of forty-
five separate documents,148 comparing the various legislative proposals to 
control air pollution emissions from powerplants. Note that this CBA 
differed from those discussed in the preceding case studies in one vital 
respect: it is an agency CBA prepared in support of a legislative proposal, 
rather than an agency CBA prepared in support of its own regulatory 
proposal.149 As such, it is not subject to the same intensive OMB review 
that accompanies CBAs agencies prepare in support of their own 
regulations, although whether it should be remains an open question.150 The 
lack of explicit standards and searching review of legislative CBAs means 
that they are more prone to political manipulation. 
In this case, the EPA’s economic analysis concluded that “Clear Skies” 
was preferable to the Jeffords and Carper proposals because it produced 
greater net social benefits than either of the alternatives.151 However, 
because the CBA was based on dubious assumptions that were vital to its 
outcome, including a highly controversial “senior death discount,” which 
imposed a lower value on the lives of (statistical) elderly Americans, and 
because those assumptions had to be explicitly specified in the CBA, other 
analysts and the media could review and critique the CBA and its 
 
148. This fact is itself problematic from the point of view of those concerned with the 
transparency, clarity, and replicability of CBAs. 
149. The EPA released a group of forty-five documents that were not collected into one document, 
but are collectively known as the EPA’s CBA. Historical Multi-Pollutant Analyses, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa-ipm/historicalmultip.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
150. Executive Orders on regulatory review, such as EO 12866, supra note 43, expressly require 
review of agency proposals of regulations; they do not speak to OMB review of agency CBAs prepared 
in support of a president’s legislative proposals. Former OIRA chief John Graham provides several 
rationales for why we might reasonably expect agency CBAs prepared in support of legislation to be 
more lax than those prepared in support of the agency’s own regulations: (1) legislative CBAs, unlike 
regulatory CBAs, are not informed by a notice and comment process; (2) the technical inputs to 
legislative CBAs are not subject to the kind of independent, external peer-review that scientific advisory 
boards provide in the case of agency CBAs for regulations; (3) legislative CBAs are not prepared with 
an eye on potential judicial review, while agency CBAs for regulations are subject to arbitrary and 
capricious review under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 USC §500 et seq.; (4) legislative CBAs 
are inherently political in nature—they are inevitably skewed to favor the administrations preferred 
policies; and (5) legislative deliberations, which focus on non-technical considerations such as values 
and political ramifications, are fundamentally different from executive-branch agency deliberations, 
which are informed by greater technical expertise. E-mail from John D. Graham, Dean, Indiana 
University School of Public and Environmental Affairs, to author (Oct. 17, 2001) (on file with the 
author). 
Dean Graham’s reasons certainly help to explain why legislative CBAs are more likely to be (a) of 
lower quality and (b) manipulated for political ends than regulatory CBAs (although it might be argued, 
for example in opposition to his first reason that Congress can and does hold hearings to inform its 
economic analyses), but they do not provide a sufficient normative argument against imposing a 
consistent set of technical obligations and standards on executive branch agencies for all CBAs. For a 
normative argument favoring consistent standards across legislative and regulatory CBAs, see infra note 
166 and accompanying text. 
151. MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 9. 
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findings.152 Less than a month after EPA published its CBA comparing 
“Clear Skies” with the Jeffords and Carper proposals, the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS)—a nonpartisan research and analysis agency of 
Congress—published a report heavily criticizing the EPA’s assumptions 
and analysis.153 What follows is a brief synopsis of the CRS report.154 
The EPA’s CBA accurately concluded that “Clear Skies” would cost 
less than the alternative legislative proposals.155 That conclusion was 
unsurprising because “Clear Skies” was far less ambitious than the other 
two proposals. It required fewer emissions reductions over a longer period 
of time. But what matters is not gross costs or benefits, but the net. And, 
according to the EPA’s own estimates, the “Clear Skies” bill would have 
provided $6 billion in annual net benefits in 2010, compared to $51 billion 
in annual net benefits for Senator Carper’s bill and $83 billion in annual net 
benefits under Senator Jeffords’s bill. 
The incremental benefits of the “Clear Skies” bill would have been 
even lower but for dubious assumptions in the CBA about the regulatory 
baseline. Specifically, the EPA assumed that in the absence of new 
legislation neither the EPA nor the states would impose additional 
regulatory controls on powerplant emissions. This assumption was 
contradicted by three newly minted EPA rules regulating powerplant 
emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury. The EPA’s final 
CBA for “Clear Skies” failed to mention those new rules. Had they been 
incorporated into the CBA, the incremental benefits of Clear Skies would 
have been much lower, and the net benefits of Senator Jeffords’s bill would 
have “far exceed[ed] those of Clear Skies” (as well as Senator Carper’s 
bill).156 
In addition to its unrealistic baseline assumptions, the EPA’s CBA for 
“Clear Skies” made no attempt to monetize environmental benefits, which 
significantly disadvantaged the Jeffords and Carper proposals because they 
were designed and predicted to generate greater environmental benefits 
than the Bush Administration’s “Clear Skies” initiative. Moreover, the 
CBA did not model the health effects of regulating mercury emissions. 
According to a different CRS Report to Congress, health benefits from the 
EPA’s mercury regulations ranged from a few million dollars per year to 
several billion dollars per year.157 Omitting these benefits, which are 






156. Id. at 14. 
157. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32868, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM 
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EPA’S CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATIONS (2006). 
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Administration’s proposal over the alternatives, either of which would have 
more quickly imposed more stringent caps on mercury emissions. 
Similarly, the EPA’s CBA for “Clear Skies” did not attempt to monetize 
the benefits of reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, the CRS 
found that the “EPA’s benefit analysis is limited and incomplete, which 
works to the disadvantage of alternatives to Clear Skies that include more 
stringent standards.”158 
The CRS Report also found that the EPA’s “Clear Skies” CBA 
unreasonably assumed that the price elasticity for electricity and natural gas 
would be zero and that powerplants were subject to short-term construction 
constraints.159 Each of these dubious assumptions served to make the Bush 
Administration’s “Clear Skies” initiative more attractive and the other 
proposals, particularly Senator Jeffords’s bill, less attractive because they 
would have entailed greater compliance costs for the utility industry. 
The CRS Report did not, in so many words, accuse the Bush 
Administration of manipulation and deception in preparing the CBA for 
“Clear Skies,” but that was the implication, which subsequent media 
reports made explicit. As a Washington Post reporter expressed it, “The 
Bush administration skewed its analysis of pending legislation on air 
pollution to favor its bill over two competing proposals.”160 The EPA 
argued in response, but without any specifics, that the CRS analysis 
“ignores and misinterprets our analysis.”161 Meanwhile, the government’s 
economic watchdog, the OMB, which is charged with reviewing the quality 
of agency CBAs, neither raised issues with nor returned the analysis to the 
EPA for improvement.162 By way of contrast, consider the case of a CBA 
for a regulation designed to protect endangered bull trout in Montana, 
which the Bush Administration opposed. In that case, the OMB required 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (F&WS) to eliminate from its RIA fifty-
five pages detailing the expected benefits of the rule because the agency 
used a methodology similar to that employed by the Bush Administration 
to derive the benefits for its “Clear Skies” initiative.163 
 
158. MCCARTHY & PARKER, supra note 74, at 16. 
159. See id. at 13. 
160. Juliet Eilperin, Report Accuses EPA of Slanting Analysis: Hill Researchers Say Agency Fixed 
Pollution Study to Favor Bush’s ‘Clear Skies’, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2005, at A08. 
161. Id. 
162. To the contrary, former OIRA chief John Graham has asserted that, “The OIRA assisted the 
EPA in preparing the benefit–cost analysis for Clear Skies.” John D. Graham, The Evolving Regulatory 
Role of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 182 (2007). 
This does not mean the OIRA was complicit in the EPA’s manipulation of the CBA for “Clear Skies,” 
however. The bulk of the CBA for “Clear Skies” was completed years before the Jeffords and Carper 
bills were offered in the Senate, and there is no evidence that the OIRA assisted the EPA in preparing 
portions of the CBA comparing the three legislative proposals. 
163. See Blaine Harden, Trout-Protection Data Questioned: Costs but No Benefits Published, 
WASH. POST, April 17, 2004, at A03. 
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The chief difference between the EPA’s CBA for “Clear Skies” and its 
CBA for protecting the endangered fish species is that the former was an 
agency CBA prepared in support of White House legislation, while the 
latter was a CBA prepared in support of its own regulation. As noted 
earlier, the OIRA is not under any general obligation to review CBAs 
prepared in support of legislative, as opposed to regulatory, proposals.164 
Still, the differential treatment of similar accounting methods across two 
different agency CBAs underscores persistent questions about whether 
OMB review in the Bush Administration was designed to maximize 
regulatory efficiency or to minimize regulatory burdens on industry.165 
This case study of the “Clear Skies” CBA suggests three important 
lessons. First, CBAs can be, and have been, strategically manipulated 
toward certain preferred outcomes.166 In the case of “Clear Skies,” the EPA 
 
164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
165. Despite John Graham’s laudable introduction of “prompt” letters, which the OMB issues to 
promote regulatory as well as deregulatory initiatives, when he headed the OIRA in the George W. 
Bush Administration, evidence exists to support the widespread belief among environmentalists that the 
Bush OMB possessed an anti-regulatory bias. A Government Accounting Office study of hundreds of 
cases of regulatory review between 2001 and 2002 found that the vast majority of proposed regulations 
changed following OMB review were weakened; virtually none were strengthened. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929 RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ 
DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003); see also David Driesen, Is Cost–
Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 364–66 (2006). The GAO’s findings are not 
necessarily evidence of bias at OMB. After all, if overregulation were endemic and underregulation 
exceedingly rare, as many conservative politicians and regulated industries would have us believe, the 
GAO’s findings would be expected. However, as Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore recently 
concluded, “there is no persuasive reason to believe that agencies pervasively tend to overregulate, 
rather than underregulate.” REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 27, at 165. Thus, the GAO’s findings are 
more difficult to explain absent OMB bias. What’s more, prior to the Clinton Administration 
deregulatory decisions were not subject to OMB review, regardless of their often significant social 
costs. Although the George W. Bush Administration did not rescind the Clinton Administration rule 
requiring OMB review of deregulatory proposals, it displayed a “relative indifference” toward such 
proposals. Id. at 154. But see John Graham, Paul R. Noe, & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the 
Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2006) 
(defending the George W. Bush OMB’s record on regulatory review). 
166. Importantly, CBAs are as prone to manipulation by (nominally) independent scholars and 
interest groups as by government agencies. Consider the case of standards for arsenic in drinking water 
established by the Clinton Administration and subsequently reconsidered by the George W. Bush 
Administration. See supra note 72. After the Clinton Administration lowered the ceiling from 50 parts 
per billion (ppb) to 10 ppb, legitimate concerns were raised about the quality of the agency’s CBA. 
Those allegations did not rise to the level of fraud or even manipulation; the agency’s assumptions 
(including of linear, as opposed to sub-linear, dose-response rates) were all defensible, if contestable. 
The EPA’s CBA was in fact contested in a critique published by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies. JASON K. BURNETT & ROBERT W. HAHN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE-
BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, EPA’S ARSENIC RULE: THE BENEFITS OF THE 
STANDARD DO NOT JUSTIFY THE COSTS (2001). In that study, Burnett and Hahn redid the EPA’s cost–
benefit analysis using different assumptions including sub-linear dose-response and lower values of 
human lives based on the presumption that arsenic’s long latency period tends to cause cancer in older, 
rather than younger, people. They concluded that the EPA’s new standard for arsenic would, if 
implemented, cost lives on net. Id. at 2. However, Burnett and Hahn’s assumptions were, if anything, 
more dubious and less justifiable than the EPA’s, and their analysis was subjected to withering critiques 
by other scholars. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 137, at 2356–65 (arguing, among other things, that 
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deliberately structured its CBA to support the Bush Administration’s 
preferred legislation against alternative proposals that would have 
increased costs for industry, but provided greater net social benefits. 
Second, and more reassuring, the manipulated CBA failed—“Clear Skies” 
was not enacted—at least in part because the manipulation was uncovered 
and exposed.167 It was uncovered because CBA methodology requires the 
explicit specification of assumptions and valuations. Thus, this case 
exemplifies Justice Brandeis’s famous aphorism, “[s]unlight is . . . the best 
of disinfectants.”168 
Ultimately, however, the demise of “Clear Skies” cannot be accounted 
a victory for regulatory rationality because Congress did not enact either 
the Jeffords bill or the Carper bill. Instead, Congress did nothing, which 
was the worst outcome from a social welfare perspective. The Bush 
Administration was for its bill or no bill at all; if it could not get collective 
action on its terms, it did not want collective action. Congress, meanwhile, 
is under no constitutional obligation to enact economically efficient 
legislation or avoid enacting economically inefficient legislation. In the 
final analysis, CBA merely provides (usually useful, though sometimes 
skewed or biased) information for decision making. It does not, and cannot, 
take the politics out of politics. 
The third and final lesson from the “Clear Skies” case study concerns 
the differential treatment of agency CBAs prepared in support of legislative 
proposals as opposed to agency regulations. Whatever the rationale(s) for 
 
Burnett and Hahn’s analysis was ideologically motivated, not properly based on the available science as 
determined by the National Academy of Sciences, and so did not really constitute a “peer review” of the 
EPA’s CBA in any legitimate sense of that phrase). It is difficult to read the Burnett and Hahn CBA as 
an even-handed effort to fairly and realistically assess costs and benefits. Their analysis favored nothing 
less than a return to the pre-existing 50 ppb standard for arsenic in drinking water, which not even the 
Bush Administration supported (as noted above, the Bush EPA merely sought to raise the standard from 
the Clinton EPA’s 10 ppb to 20 ppb). Nevertheless, conservative groups found Burnett and Hahn’s 
analysis useful in their ultimately unsuccessful political campaign against the Clinton standard. See 
Special Report: The Arsenic Controversy, REGULATION, Fall 2001, at 42. 
167. John Graham suggests that the demise of “Clear Skies” in the Senate had more to do with the 
election cycle and President Bush’s “limited leadership” on climate change. JOHN D. GRAHAM, BUSH 
ON THE HOME FRONT: DOMESTIC POLICY TRIUMPHS AND SETBACKS 200–01 (2010). 
168. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES’ MONEY 92 (1913). Arguably, even more transparency, 
not in the CBA itself, but in agency processes relating to the preparation and publication of CBAs, 
would make the tool even more useful, and less subject to abuse, in policymaking. Aidan Vining and 
David Weimer have proposed a rule (for the Canadian government) according to which any federal 
government agency, provincial government, or local government seeking federal financial support for 
infrastructure “must file for the public record . . . a cost–benefit analysis . . . with the Treasury Board 
and the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons.” The CBA would be posted on an 
Internet site to which any interested person could post comments. Aidan R. Vining & David L. Weimer, 
Criteria for Infrastructure Investment: Normative, Positive, and Prudential Perspectives 28–29 (April 8, 
2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). The purpose is to make the process of 
preparing CBAs more transparent, so as to “discourage the wildest claims of benefits” (and costs). Id. at 
30. 
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such differential treatment,169 the failure to impose and enforce design 
standards on agency CBAs in support of legislative proposals creates 
opportunities for political manipulation that potentially discredit CBA in 
general. If a certain approach to benefit accounting is inappropriate for 
regulatory CBAs, then it should be equally inappropriate for legislative 
CBAs. The lack of methodological consistency across regulatory and 
legislative domains inevitably casts a shadow over CBA generally as a 
policy-informing tool. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Read together, the three case studies from the preceding section 
illustrate three basic characteristics of the politics of CBA: (1) it is a useful 
tool for both protecting against welfare-reducing regulations and protecting 
welfare-enhancing regulations from political attack and rollback; (2) 
inherently subjective elements of CBAs make them liable to manipulation 
and abuse to make regulatory proposals appear welfare-maximizing when 
they are not, and vice versa; but (3) the transparency of formal CBA allows 
for exposure and correction of manipulations and flaws. Taken together, 
these points tell an overall, but not entirely, positive story about the role of 
CBA in politics and in the substantive resolution of social dilemmas. 
The three case studies also suggest two less obvious implications for 
CBA’s role in the resolution of collective-action problems. First, CBAs 
have substantial utility for decision making on social-cost problems even 
when the law does not permit their use. As the first case study suggests, 
even if the EPA were no longer required by statute and executive order of 
the President to prepare CBAs, agency staff might well choose to prepare 
them anyway in order to (a) inform themselves of economic sources of 
potential political backlash and (b) defuse political opposition in cases 
where the CBA is positive. Second, because the Constitution does not 
compel Congress to enact only welfare-enhancing legislation, CBA 
necessarily remains subordinate to other political goals and motivations. 
This was the case, for example, with the “Clear Skies” program, where the 
Bush Administration was not intent on maximizing a social-welfare 
function but in implementing its own preferred policy—or no policy at all. 
The virtuous transparency of CBA allowed the Congressional Research 
Service to expose the flaws in the EPA’s CBA for “Clear Skies,” showing 
that other, more stringent legislative proposals would generate greater net 
social benefits. The CRS critique helped to kill “Clear Skies,” but it could 
not ensure the enactment of the other, more socially efficient proposals. 
 
169. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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We must be careful, however, not to draw too many or too firm 
conclusions about political uses and abuses of CBA from these three case 
studies because they are merely a convenience sample and are not 
necessarily representative of the wide range of circumstances in which 
CBAs are prepared and used in the federal government (not to mention 
state and local governments). For one thing, all three of the case studies 
involve the EPA, which is just one of many federal, executive branch 
agencies, albeit one with an unusually high level of experience and 
expertise in preparing CBAs. Second, two of the three case studies concern 
proposed changes to National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) 
under the Clean Air Act, which is an unusual circumstance precisely 
because, as a matter of law, the standards must be set regardless of cost. 
Third, and finally, none of the three case studies directly concerns the 
social discount rate, which, as noted in Part II, is a major factor in political, 
economic, and philosophical disputes over CBA. In each of the three case 
studies, the outcome of the CBA was fairly insensitive to the choice of a 
discount rate. However, in many other cases, especially those with effects 
extending into the distant future, that is, intergenerational effects, the social 
discount rate almost invariably becomes a focal point of contention and 
disagreement.170 
Finally, those who write about social-cost problems and 
legislation/regulatory solutions should not neglect the significant political 
role CBAs, among other decision-making tools, play in policy arenas. This 
Article has merely described how CBAs do so. More research is needed to 
determine the extent to which CBAs actually influence outcomes and to 




170. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
